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BOOK REVIEWS

The Indian Feminist Movement: Law, Religion and
Politics
Geetanjali Gangoli
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REFORM AND REVIVAL. New Delhi:Radiant, 1993.
GABRIELE
DIETRICH,
REFLECTIONS
ON THE WOMEN'S
MOVEMENT
IN INDIA:
RELIGION,
ECOLOGY
AND
DEVELOPMENT. New Delhi:Horizon, 1992.
ARCHANA PARASHAR, WOMEN AND FAMILY LAW REFORM
IN INDIA, UNIFORM CIVIL CODE AND GENDER EQUALITY. New
Delhi:Sage Publications, 1992.
Legal reforms have been an integral part of the colonial women's
question and the post-colonial feminist movement in India.! Recently,
however, the movement has begun to question it's interaction with the
law. In spite of intensive efforts to bring about changes in law, the status
of women in Indian society has not improved: if anything, crimes against
women have proliferated. The increasing communalisation of legal
discourse in contemporary India has further aggravated the situation.
Given these developments feminists have been compelled to confront the
question whether law and legal reform offer scope for women's
empowerment beyond a point?
The three books that are under review form a continuum on this
question. Maitrayee Choudhuri has given an insightful study of pre1947 reform and revival movements which attempted to improve certain
aspects of the condition of Indian women.2 Gabriele Dietrich examines
the contemporary feminist movement in India and its interaction with
*

Geetanjali Gangoli is a feminist researcher, and activist with Action India, Women's
Programme in New Delhi.
By 'women's question', I refer to the attempts by male reformers in the nineteenth
century who tried to reform the conditions of Indian middle class women. The term
is coined by historian SUMIT SARKAR, THE CRITIQUE OF COLONIAL INDIA
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law, religion and rights, amongst other issues.3 Archana Parashar traces
the origin of religious personal law as colonial and argues that the State
has adopted discrepant policies with respect to different religious laws.4
The common thread of law that run through these three books weave
together a tapestry, however incomplete, of some of the concerns that
absorb the contemporary feminist movement.
Chou dhu ri 's book shows a pervasive awareness of the ways in which
the dominant discourse on law, religion and women, constructed under
colonial rule, has impacted post-colonial India. The book traces the
construction of the mainstream discourse on the women's question in
colonial India - which was centered around legal reforms for women from the mid-nineteenth century to the independence of India. She sees
the ability of social reforms to intervene in the process of creating new
laws as being organically connected to the colonial context.
Choudhuri explores how legal reform forms an integral part of the
debate on the contesting versions of female emancipation in the nineteenth
century. Raja Rammohan Roy, Iswarchand Vidyasagar, Ranade, Jyotirao
Phule, all participated in the debate which was gradually integrated into
the larger questions of national liberation and regeneration. As Choudhuri
recognises, the nationalist construction of the middle class woman
accompanied a break with popular culture and with Islamic culture.
Simultaneously, Islamic revivalism emerged which tried to explain the
muslim social practices and restate its superiority, while rejecting antiwomen practices like purdah and polygamy as un-Islamic. Meanwhile,
however, nationalism became associated with hindu culture and tradition.
The book examines the emergence of communalism through a
gendered perspective. The discourse around tradition and nationalism
was centered around the status of women and their legal rights. The
regenerated hindu woman was the ideal and the muslim woman could
only be the 'other' in the discourse on law, religion and nationhood.s
Yet, there is a significant difference between colonial and post-colonial
India that is not spelt out in Choudhuri' s book. She does not hesitate in
3
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The concept of discourse and 'other' is a part of Foucauldian interpretation. As Joan
Wallach Scott points out, following Foucauldian logic, a discourse forms a logical
coherent system, which can operate only by simultaneously constructing its 'other',
that is, all that stands against it. The discourse and its 'other' form a larger uniform
whole: in JOAN WALLACH SCOTT, GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF
mSTORY 1-11 (1988).
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calling the attempts to fight for women's rights by male social reformers
of the nineteenth century a "women's movement." While men like Raja
Rammohan Roy, Ishwarchand Vidyasagar, and Jyotirao Phule showed a
rare sensitivity to issues of gender inequality, it would still be inaccurate
to describe this as a women's movement.
Significantly, her book does not mention the role of women like
Pandita Ramabai, who posed a challenge to both colonial and nationalist
constructions of womanhood, as being anti-women.6 As a consequence,
Ramabai is not a subject of mainstream nationalist historiography. In
other words it was far easier for a man to question and recast the image
of the Indian woman during colonial times than for a woman.
In contemporary India, the situation is different. Today, feminists
have challenged patriarchal constructions of women in significant ways.
Without romanticising the movement, it would be accurate to state that
women today choose the agenda for struggle far more autonomously
than their counterparts in colonial times, when they were simultaneously
burdened with the challenge of fighting colonial domination.
Law has formed an integral pan of the challenge to patriarchy,
providing a link between colonial and post-colonial India. Raja Rammohan
Roy's attempt to reform society, religion and the status of women was
primarily through an appeal to colonial rulers to reform laws. Yet for
Roy the appeal to reform law could not transcend the decreed principles
of religion. He mobilised scholars to interpret the scriptures to dig out
passages that favoured austerity in widowhood over Sati. The discourse
simultaneously tried to appeal to the liberal theory of rights -that women,
as human beings, were entitled to equality. Yet when the two principles
clashed, as they often would, the decreed principles of religion were
prioritisec1 to liberal notions of rights.
Another aspect of the debate around law and recasting the Indian
woman is apparent in the debate around the Hindu Code Bill immediately
after Independence. The proposal to introduce changes in the status of
the hindu woman through legal reforms, as Choudhuri notes, unleashed a
furor among hindu revivalists.? They saw it as unwarranted interference

6

7

Pandita Ramabai was a Brahmin widow living in late nineteenth century Maharashtra.
Her works critique Brahmin patriarchy and its effects on high caste Women. She
often clashed with her better known contemporaries, Bal Gangadhar Tilak, for one,
against issues like the Age of Consent Bill and took an uncompromising
stand
against mainstream nationalist patriarchal conceptions of the ideal hindu woman.
This, and her subsequent rejection of Hinduism and conversion to Christianity made
her an outcast. Mainstream historiam of !he nationlllist movement have also ignored
her role.
Supra note 2, at 6.

Vol. I]

The Indian F eminist Movement

187

in their traditions, but were keen to introduce a Uniform Civil Code
(UCC). TIris tacitly meant restructuring Islamic personal law. That past
prejudices continue to pervade present politics is apparent from the recent
Shah Bano case. The resultant debates projected this as a national issue,
but simultaneously described State intervention in the Roop Kanwar case
an uncalled for measure. As in colonial times, the national interest is
associated with the perspective of the hindu, high caste male. Within this
discourse anti-women stands and customs within high caste Hinduism
are not open to debate. The liberal theory of rights is seen as relevant
only for the beliefs of minorities, especially of muslims.
Law has become communalised creating a situation in which the
interests of women take a back seat. M.V. Kazi who wrote to a leading
English newspaper stated:
... it is a pity that the issue of muslim personal law has been
politicised by motivated people and thus vitiated the atmosphere
for a serious debate. As a Muslim, I am only too well aware of
what needs to be done. But let me make it very plain, I won't
oblige those who regard any identity except their own (a:;) inferior,
alien and unpatriotic and who would shed copious tears on the
plight of Muslim women but have no sympathy to spare when
these very women are made widows ...As a Muslim, I would not
mind having a common civil code provided the code incorporates
the good points of all the existing codes.8
In such a context, supporting the demand for a UCC is not as
uncomplicated as it seems.
TIris is furth~r brought out in Archana Parashar's work. Her book
provides an insightful study of family laws in India through a gendered
perspective and discusses the need to adopt a Uniform Civil Code.
Parashar trdces the colonial origins of the concept of religious personal
law in their present institutional form. She suggests that the postindependence nation-state has developed a strategy that is communal and
anti-women. The hindu personal law has been extensively ref0rmed,
while other personal laws have not been touched. TIris has led to a
situation where women of minority communities have been subjected to
laws that are more unequal than hindu personal laws.
Parashar examines two significant questions: how the State justifies
inequality for women through religious personal laws and why the State
8

Cited in Madhu Kishwar, "Pro-Women or Anti-Muslim: The Shah Bano Controversy"
32 MANUS HI 5 (1986).
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has denied equality to women. The State denies equality rights to women,
in particular to women of minority communities, by asserting the
importance of religion for the majority of Indians and also by treating
religion as an arena for fighting electoral battles. Her thesis is that the
State acts out of political expediency and lacks a basic commitment to
ideals of gender equality and justice.
Finally, Parashar suggests that even though the reform of religious
personal law is linked to the personal considerations of a nation-state,
the interests of the State and women need not always be mutually
antagonistic, if feminists intervene effectively.
While Parashar is an unconditional supporter of the UCC, she
undercuts her own position by elaborating the inherent patriarchal nature
of the Indian State. As she points out, there have been attempts to reform
the hindu family law, but on several occasions, the interests of the
lawmakers have been anti-women. The contradiction between the stated
and actual aims of the Indian State is evident from the following quote:
The Select Committee of the Constituent Assembly was the first
to put the son and daughter on par with regard to the quantum of
their share of inheritance .. But Ambedkar, the great champion of
hindu law reform, described the alteration as an effort by his
enemies to make the entire reform ridiculous, and thereby cause
the entire reform process to be abandoned ... Not only was the
idea that women ought to be given their due rights not often
articulated, but the law minister had no problems implying that
equal shares for sons and daughters was a preposterous idea.9
Within the paradigm of an anti-woman State, it would be
unrealistic for feminists to expect the State to implement a UCC that
would answer the needs of all Indian women and grant them gender
equality. Besides, as Parashar recognises, changes in the law in India
does not impact the lives of most women, since the legal system is too
alien for them. But, she continues, in spite of all these odds, the law
continues to have a theoretical and symbolic importance. 10
Choudhuri also unconditionally supports the UCC and suggests that
it should be an integral part of the feminist movement today. According
to her:
The relatively recent defence of Sati, the hostility towards the
Mandal Commission and the rejection of a possible DCC among
9
10
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proponents of cultural relativism are indicative pointers of a
modem version of liberal colonialism caught on the wrong foot... 11
The statement quoted above is incomplete and partial. To conflate
proponents of Sati, opponents of the Mandal Commission and opponents
of the uec is historically false. Many in the feminist movement have
opposed Sati and supported the Mandal Commission, while opposing the
Uniform Civil Code. They rightly question the communal overtones that
the demand for a Code has adopted. That the Bhartiya Janata Party and
the Shiv Sena are among the most strident voices urging for a UCC
should give us a cause to pause and reflect. Added to this is a reasonable
estimate of the nature of the Indian State and the inability of the feminist
movement to influence the nature of a prospective UCe.
Emerging from the debate around the communalisation of law is a
larger question: Should the feminist movement rethink its position towards
legal reforms and appeals to the State? By appealing to the State to make
changes, perhaps the movement is empowering the State further. This
would have an adverse effect on the movement's primary battle against
the State's inherent patriarchal and communal nature.
Dietrich show~ some awareness to the question raised above. Her
book consists of a collection of essays that raise fundamental questions
on issues confronting Indian women: sexuality, the sexual division of
labour, power relationships and human dignity, and the links between
datit movements and the feminist movement. The two essays I have
focused on study the links between women's rights and freedom of
religion. She suggests that personal laws in India are regulated by religion
which deprive women of their rights to inheritance and divorce. She also
examines the women's movements concern with communal politics in
riot situations. However, she suggests that the feminist movement needs
to rethink its attitude to religion as being inherently exploitative, since it
has potential for empowering women. Besides, as religion is central to
the lives of most women, it cannot be dismissed as false consciousness.
Simultaneously, Dietrich recognises that more recently the Indian
feminist movement has become aware of its unconsciously hindu leanings.
This became implicit in Flavia Agnes' statement at the National
Conference on Women's Studies, Calcutta, February 1991. Ravia, a
feminist activist and christian, noted her own discrimination as a minority
person within the movement. She alleged that reform of religious personal
laws is normally seen as the responsibility of minorities, projected as
11

CHAUDHURI, supra note 2, at x. Cultural relativism here refers to the belief that
value judgments cannot be attached to the cultural practices of people.
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inherently being more backward and oppressive towards women, though
changes are as much needed in the Hindu law and the Special Marriage
Act. 12
Dietrich proposes one possible way through this impasse.
She
suggests that feminists should delve deep into religious texts, myths and
symbols, isolate areas of strength for women and attempt to reinterpret
tradition in feminist ways. Law that could empower women should form
a focal point in this search and thus can be used as starting points around
which women can form new codes. Furthermore, a feminist analysis of
symbolic figures like Sita can transform her from the figure of an ideal,
long suffering wife to a self-willed courageous woman.13 Dietrich suggests
that such an approach would allow women to rediscover their roots in
positive, feminist ways and prevent alienation from their own community,
as was Shah Bano's experience.
This suggestion is valuable, yet not without its limitations. Can one
expect that religious heads, used to asserting their dominance over women
through law and religion will easily accept this radical reinterpretation of
tradition? The attempt will also be seen as eclectic and lacking legitimacy
since the roots of religion do not easily lend themselves to feminist
interpretation and use. It's roots are deeply entrenched in patriarchal
ideology. The hindu marriage, for instance, has been the focus of many
individual attempts by feminists to forge changes. They have altered the
words of many shlokhas to infuse gender equality in the marriage vows.
Yet the marriage remains centered around the 'Kanyadaan' (the giving
away of the virgin to the bridegroom by the bride's father). This basic
inequality has not been redressed by the attempts of some feminists.
Besides, as historians have found, while there are hindu texts favouring
austerity in widowhood over the practice of Sati, there are almost none
that decries Sati altogether or speaks for the rights of single women to
live with dignity. The laws of no religionll11ow women the right to
divorce. Hindu women in modem India, who possess this right, owe this
not to a radical interpretation of religion, but to the influence of a liberal
theory of rights.
The relationship between the feminist movement and law is more
complicated than any of the authbrs explores. Our history exposes that
pro-woman changes in law have rarely helped women. In spite of an
amended anti-dowry law, women continue to be harassed and killed for
bringing in "inadequate" or no dowry in greater numbers than before.
The intensive lobbying by feminists that resulted in substantial
12
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amendments to the rape law has not led to a decrease in th~ number of
rapes committed nor an increase in convictions of rapists. The present
involvement of the movement is on the question of sexual harassment at
work, as a concomitant to the rape of Bhanwari, a Saathin worker in
Rajasthan's Women and Development Programme in September 1992.14
Amongst the proposed strategies is the filing of a writ, demanding a law
on sexual harassment in the work place and further changes in the rape
laws.
Perhaps, the feminist movement today needs to stop and consider its
own history at this point. Have its attempts to work through the legal
process helped to empower women in substantial ways? Or, by demanding
changes through the state machinery, is it reducing the movements own
ability to protest and fundamentally challenge the State? Are there viable
alternatives to the legal system for feminists? What is the scope that
religion and tradition offer for feminist interpretation and women's
empowerment? Or, should the feminist movement work out strategies to
control law? Perhaps these questions can enable the feminist movement
to negotiate its strategies with regard to the complex and powerful
relationship between law, religion and politics, and fmd creative ways
out of it's current impasse.
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